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ince my task is to critically evaluate the
authors’ model, I will do so by asking,
If our objective is to understand the
connection between price stability and eco-
nomic growth, would exploration of the
kind of model that Sangmok Choi, Bruce
D. Smith, and John H. Boyd present in this
article be a high priority? My answer is,
probably not. In the comments that follow,
I lay out reasons for my response.
ABSENCE OF INFLATION
UNCERTAINTY
As the article opens, the authors write
that “A consensus among economists
seems to be that high rates of inﬂation
cause ‘problems,’ not just for some indi-
viduals, but for aggregate economic perfor-
mance.” This is a fair statement, but I
would argue that uncertainty about inﬂa-
tion plays a key role in making high 
inﬂation a problem. Ample evidence sug-
gests that the level and variability of inﬂa-
tion go hand in hand. In addition, it is not
far-fetched to think that average inﬂation
and the variability of unanticipated inﬂa-
tion might go hand in hand. If I were
choosing to focus either on anticipated or
unanticipated inﬂation, I would put higher
priority on gathering evidence on unantic-
ipated inﬂation and constructing models
in which its variability played a key role.
However, I must admit that to con-
struct coherent models that focus on
unanticipated inﬂation is not easy. Issues
about indexation (or lack thereof) of in-
tertemporal contracts to changes in the 
inﬂation rate loom large and must be ad-
dressed. Still, the evidence clearly shows
that high-inﬂation economies cannot eas -
ily move to indexed contracts and insulate
their residents from problems of unantici-
pated inﬂation at low cost. For instance,
indexation is never comprehensive. Dur-
ing the ’60s in Brazil, indexed contracts
covered some wages, bank deposits, gov-
ernment bonds, rents, and some utilities.
Conspicuously absent were contracts cov-
ering the purchase of intermediate and
capital goods. Furthermore, indexation
schemes are often imposed by a desperate
government and are poorly conceived.
Last but not least, indexation prevents efﬁ-
cient adaptation to supply shocks, a failing
that researchers noted in the ’70s.
STRONG NON-
SUPERNEUTRALITY
Inﬂation has real effects in Choi,
Smith, and Boyd’s model because it inﬂu-
ences the real return on capital. In a mone-
tary equilibrium, any change in the real re-
turn on currency leads to a corresponding
one-for-one change in the real return on
physical capital. I should emphasize that
“threshold effects” do not apply to the con-
nection between anticipated inﬂation and
ex ante real interest rates in the model:
Both low- and high-inﬂation countries
should display this feature. I am troubled
because I know of no evidence that sup-
ports such strong non-superneutrality with
respect to ex ante real interest rates.
The authors provide regression results
in which inﬂation affects real interest rates
negatively and strongly. In these regres-
sions, the real interest rate (the dependent
variable) is the ex post real interest rate
and the inﬂation rate is the actual inﬂation
rate. With a substantial unexpected com-
ponent to actual inﬂation, realized inﬂa-
tion will affect ex post real interest rates
negatively and strongly. It is difﬁcult to
take these regressions as evidence that an -
ticipated inﬂation has strong negative ef-
fects on ex ante real interest rate.
One way to modify these regressions is
to replace the inﬂation variable on the right
side with some measure of anticipated inﬂa-
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tion. Geweke (1986) did this for the United
States by using low-frequency movements
in inﬂation as a proxy for anticipated inﬂa-
tion. He found no evidence that anticipated
inﬂation had any effect on output or ex 
post real interest rates. I believe he would
have picked up some evidence of non-
superneutrality if the authors’ model was a
reasonable abstraction of reality. I am unfa-
miliar with the evidence of Geweke-style re-
gressions for other countries, but it troubles
me that his ﬁndings do not support the
model’s prediction for the United States.
UNSECURED LOANS
In his trailblazing paper on adverse 
selection, Akerlof (1970) noted that his
work was an attempt to give structure to
the statement, “Business in underdevel-
oped countries is difﬁcult.” Exploring the
dynamic consequences of adverse selection
in simple models of economic growth is
certainly an important step toward giving
additional structure to that statement.
Nevertheless, I am skeptical about the
speciﬁc adverse selection story the authors
tell. Recall that the reason adverse selec-
tion afﬂicts intertemporal trade is because
lenders cannot distinguish between gen-
uine borrowers who have access to the
capital accumulation technology and fake
borrowers who do not. However, if lenders
insisted on securing their loans against
tangible capital (collateral), only genuine
borrowers would qualify because they are
the only ones who can produce this capital
and the equilibrium would revert to being
Walrasian. The fact that the primitives of
the model (preferences and technology) do




Choi, Smith, and Boyd point out
some nonlinearities and nonmonotonici-
ties observed in the relationships between
inﬂation and real activity. They cite these
observations as reasons for constructing
models in which inﬂation affects real ac-
tivity in complex and nonlinear ways.
What is unclear to me is why I should
not approach these observations from the
opposite direction and think about con-
structing models in which poor economic
performance leads to poor monetary pol-
icy. In other words, it is unclear to me
which phenomenon is really to be ex-
plained. 
Robert Lucas (1988) observed that it
was difﬁcult to look at the measured dis-
parity in long-run growth rates across
countries “without seeing them as repre-
senting possibilities.” I am struck by the
fact that when confronted with similar
disparities in inﬂation and monetary
growth rates across countries, economists
construe the important scientiﬁc problem
to be one of understanding the conse -
quences of different rates of sustained in-
ﬂation, rather than one of understanding
how inﬂation and monetary growth rates
became so different across countries in
the ﬁrst place. I suspect that if we set out
to explain differences in inﬂation and
monetary growth rates among countries,
we will probably uncover many reasons
why inﬂation and real activity might ap-
pear related in complex and nonlinear
ways.
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